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Intertemporal Constraints, Shadow Prices, and Financial Asset Values
ABSTRACT
Theconditions under which the unobserved shadow price of
capital can be equated to the financial value of the firm have been
developed in an important paper by Hayashi (1982). Employing a more
powerful analytic method, this paper reexamines the shadow price-
asset value relation in a model with a general set of intertemporal
constraints. For a model with one capital good, a general relation
between shadow prices and asset values is derived, and restrictive
assumptions implicit in previous work are highlighted. Of particular
importance is the relation between the marginal and average survival
rates of capital, and the critical role of geometric depreciation. The
impact of a discrete-time framework in specifying and interpreting
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I. Introduction
In dynamic models of the firm, intertemporal constraints are
represented by distributed lag and convex technologies.In the
presence of the former constraint (e.g., capital accumulation), shadow
prices play the critical role in intertemporal allocation decisions, but
are not generally observed by applied econometricians. This
problem is likely to occur when the model also includes convex
constraints (e.g., adjustment costs), and has been addressed in one of
two ways. The first solution specifies and estimates the underlying
stochastic process for the components of the unobservable, and then
computes the shadow price from forecasts of its components. This
class of solutions includes the two-step procedure of Abel and
Blanchard (1984), the maximum likelihood estimator of Hansen and
Sargent (1980), and the Euler equation technique of Hansen and
Singleton (1982); in the latter case, the forecasting equations are
determined by the choice of instruments. These methods arose in
response to the critique of Lucas (1976), who argued that "any
change in policy will systematically alter the stmcture of
econometric models" (p. 41).Under this view, changes in policy are
identified as changes in the parameters governing policy outcomes,
and these parameters will generally affect forecasts of economic
variables. Only if one maintains that the sample period contains no
changes in policy or non-policy factors affecting the posited
stochastic process will the forecasting solution to the unobserved
shadow price problem be valid.2
The second class of solutions, which will be the focus of this
paper, relates financial asset values to the unobservedshadow
prices, and possesses the substantial advantage that estimation can
proceed even in an unstable stochastic environment. In an
important paper, Hayashi (1982) developed the conditions under
which the shadow price of capital could be equated to the value of
the firm as assessed on asset markets, thus providing a formal
theoretical foundation for the Tobin's (1969) Qmodelof investment.1
Limited by the analytic method, however, this work did not
recognize the significance of a number of implicit assumptions
concerning distributed lag constraints. Employing the techniques
introduced by Kamien and Muller (1976), the current study will be
able to highlight the importance of these distributed lag constraints
on the shadow price-asset value relation.
A general discrete-time model of the firm with one capital good
but two distributed lags is developed and analyzed in Section II. The
relation between shadow prices and asset values are drawn in
Section III and, when restrictive assumptions concerning the
distributed lag technology are relaxed, the usefulness of asset price
data is severely compromised. The conditions under which asset
prices remain useful to the applied econometrician and the impact of
a discrete-time framework on the specification and interpretationof
econometric models are also explored.
1 See Chirinko (1987) for a survey of Qmodelsutilized in the study
of business fixed investment. Hasbrouck (1985) has used Qtostudy
takeovers; Lindenberg and Ross (1981), Salinger (1984), and
Smirlock, Gilligan and Marshall (1984) to examine the relationship
between firm rents and market structureII. Conditions Characterizing An Optimum
In this section, a general model of the firm containing both
distributed lag and convex constraints is developed. The firm
chooses labor inputs and one capital input to maximize its end of
period equity value (V0), defined as the discounted sum of net
revenues (7t[Kt1}),
=t:01,t r[Kt.i], (la)
01,t =sUi (l+p)-1, (ib)
wheret[.] is defined with respect to the optimal level of the variable
labor inputs, 01,isthe discount factor between periods 1 and t, and
Ps is the one-period discount rate. Net revenues depend positively
on the capital stock available at the beginning of the current period
(K..i; i.e., at the end of the previous period), and become available to
the firm at the end of the current period. For notational convenience,
all relative prices are assumed constant, and taxes are omitted.
The firm can increase its capital stock only indirectly through
the placement of new orders (Or) and, in maximizing (1), faces two
distributed lag constraints.2First, the quantity of delivered capital
goods (Dr) is determined through the delivery lag by current and
past orders. Second, following delivery, capital depreciates over
time, and the capital stock depends on a fixed set of survival weights.
2 The model can be expanded easily to include additional distributed
lag constraints -forexample, the gestation lag between deliveries
and increments to the productive capital stock and the expenditure
lag between orders and payments.
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These two constraints are represented by the following linear
technologies ,3
D =It-sOs, 0 ￿ ￿ 1 u=O,b (2a)
K = D5, 0 ￿ ￿ 1 u=0,d (2b)
t—d
where b is the length of the delivery lag, d is the length of capital's
useful life, and the 13's and 6's represent the delivery and capital
depreciation technologies, respectively.In this discrete-time
framework, deliveries and net revenues (including expenditures) are
received and the capital stock is altered at the end of the period.
Current deliveries thus have no effect on current net revenues, and
do not begin depreciating until the following period (i.e., ö=1).
In addition to the distributed lag constraints (2), the firm faces
two convex constraints representing the adjustment costs associated
with placing orders and incorporating new capital into the production
process.4 These costs are represented in the model as negative
arguments in the net revenue function.
In calculating the necessary conditions for an optimum, we
could substitute for D and K..i with (2) and then differentiate (1)
with respect to new orders. Even with relatively simple technologies,
the resulting computations can prove complex, and economic
interpretations can be obscure. A preferred alternative, introduced
3 In general, these technologies may depend on the control and state
variables or on time. Consideration of these more general
representations usually leads to models that are empirically
intractable, and would thus obfuscate the main results in this paper.
4 Adjustment costs were analyzed initially in the models of Eisner
and Strotz (1963) and Lucas (1967), and are an intergal element in
the Tobin's Qinvestmentmodel (Abel, 1979; Hayashi, 1982).by Kamien and Muller (1976), is to append the constraints to (1)





+01,t {Do,+ X Ko,}.
The sums for the delivery and depreciation lags have been split into
two parts to separate variables that depend on current decisions and
those that are predetermined (though not necessarily constant) from
the beginning of period 1 onward. These predetermined variables
are defined as follows,
Do, = Os, 0 ￿ t ￿ b (4a)
Ko, = D5. 0 ￿ t ￿ d (4b)
Since Do,t and Ko, represent precommittments made prior to period
1, they will not affect optimal choices over the planning horizon, but
will be important in linking the financial value of the firm to the
shadow price of capital.
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Tofacilitate the calculation of the necessary conditions for an
optimum, it will prove convenient to utilize the following
transformation,5
t t+c
?-5 X=Oi, X (Ot,s/Ot,t)'v , (5)





With(3) and (5),weconstruct the following current-value
Hamiltonian,
H[Kt, D, O A., 4, t] =
ei,{ D, Ot] -t- t K
t+b
+Ot (Ot,s/Ot,t) 13s-t 4s (6) s=t
.-
+ D(Ot,s/Ot,t) 8s-t 's }. t￿ 1
The necessary conditions for an optimum are computed by differ-
entiating H [.1withrespect to the state (Ks, D) and control (Or)
variables,6
5Thetransformation follows directly by stating (5)inmatrix
notation and then transposing the scalar expression.
6 The necessity of these conditions for an optimum has been
established by Kleindorfer, Kleindorfer, and Thompson (1977) and
Weitzman and Schmidt (1971).7
K: 7 =K[u+l]/ (i+Pu+i), (7a)
=(6/9) +[s] D[I ￿ 0 (7b)
0:-7r0[t} =b(Ot,s16t,t) 1- (7c)
0: 7t0,0(t) ￿ 0, (7d)
Lim 01,t 4D—O Lim 0,t ? K--*0 (7e)
t—oo t—°°
These conditions have the following economic interpretations.
In (7a), the marginal value of an additional unit of productive capital
in a given time period equals next period's marginal product
discounted by the cost of capital. This formulation arises because
production is affected by the capital stock available at the beginning
of the period and net revenues accrue at the end of the period. By
weighting these ?'s over the useful life of the capital good and
subtracting the adjustment costs associated with deliveries, we
obtain in (7b) the marginal value of an additional delivery, 4, the
shadow price of new capital. The counterbalancing marginal cost
from placing an order is stated on the left side of (7c), and is equated
to the sum of shadow prices weighted by delivery lag parameters
and discount factors. In addition, the firm's optimal policy is
constrained by the intertemporal technologies for deliveries (2a) and
capital (2b). In regard to the depreciation technology, it should be
noted that the 8's are relatively unrestricted, and an advantage of the
model developed here is that, rather than assuming depreciation
occurs geometrically, as has been done in most previous studies,alternative patterns, such as straight-line or "one-hoss-shay," can be
considered. Throughout we assume that the constraints are always
binding and the optimal level of orders is always non-negative.
Since the constraints are linear, the Kuhn-Tucker constraint
qualifications are satisfied, and the sufficiency of (7) depends on the
properties of [.]
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III. The Unobserved Shadow Price Of Capital And The Financial
Value Of The Firm
The above characterization of the firm's optimal policy is not
useful in empirical work because it contains variables unobserved by
the applied researcher.7 In the present context, this problem arises
because 4, depends on the path of ?'s extending far into the future.
In Proposition I, we explore the relation between the unobserved
shadow price of capital and the financial value of the firm in a
discrete-time framework with two distributed lag constraints.
Proposition I
V0 =t]O1t {4D0, + Xt Ko,} m =max[b,d] (8)
if and only if
it[•] is homogeneous of degree one in all arguments and the output
and factor markets are perfectly competitive.
Derivation
The homogeneity of ic[] implies that
01,t{ it[t]-7r0[t]Ot -7tD[t]D -°t+1,t+17tK[t+fl K }= 0. (9a)
7 While the firm has been endowed heretofore with perfect foresight,
the model can be recast with no loss in generality as one in which the
firm maximizes expected profits, where expectations are conditioned
on information known when decisions are being undertaken.10
Sum over t from 1 to oeandsubstitute (7a), (7b), and (7c),
t+b
ei, { ir[t]+ (Ot,s/Ot,t) -4D (9b)
+D:(Ot,s/Ot,t)6.tX-?.K }= 0.
The two inner sum in (9b) can be transformed according to (5),
10i,t[t1
=10it{ 4 [D O] (9c)
+ ? {K -siD] }.
In (9c), the left side is the value of the firm (la). On the right side,
the first term in braces represents deliveries from orders made prior
to the beginning of the planning period (Doe; 4a); a similar
interpretation applies to the second braced term in regard to capital
(K0,; 4b). Noting that Do, and Ko, are zero for t ￿ m =max[b,d],we
obtain (8). The converse follows directly.II
In(9), the asset value of the firm does not identify the shadow
price of capital, as V0 depends on discount factors, shadow prices,
deliveries, and capital stocks extending m periods into the future.
The intuition underlying this result is that, since markets are
competitive, the firm is unable to earn any economic profits from
period 1 onward. The cash flows on the precommitted stocks
represent quasi-rents that are measured as the product of
anticipated deliveries and existing capital multiplied by their shadow11
prices. The importance of the constant returns to scale assumption is
that these shadow prices are independent of the stocks.8
That the asset value of the firm is not a sufficient statistic for
identifying the shadow price of capital stems from two independent
factors. The first is that the financial markets generate only one
variable to evaluate the firm's profit possibilities, but these are
affected by the two state variables following from the distributed lag
constraintsMultiple distributed lags arise when production depends
on multiple capital stocks with different technologies (Chirinko, 1982;
Wildasin, 1984) or, as highlighted in this model, when there is only
one capital stock but other constraints impinge on the firm.
However, the inadequacy of asset values extends beyond the number
of distributed lags, and also involves the nature of the distributed lag
parameters.If we assume that capital is delivered immediately
upon order (i.e., ij=l, 3=O, u=l,b), Do, =0,and we obtain the
following relation,
Vo =t1 Ko,. (10)
In the case of only one distributed lag but with unrestricted
parameters, (10) indicates that the asset value remains unable to
identify the shadow price of capital. This important result is masked
when the analysis is conducted in terms of standard capital
transition equations that depend on geometric depreciation.
The above considerations lead to the following proposition.
8 If relative prices were allowed tovary, then the assumption of
perfectly competitive markets would be needed to ensure their
independence from current decisions.12
Proposition II
Given the assumptions in Proposition I and the absence of a delivery
lag, the financial value of the firm and the shadow price of capital
are related as follows,
V0 =(4(1—6) Ktj) / (l+pi) (11)
if and only if




V0 =o9i,t 't 't (12a)
K0 = 6(-s)D, (12b)
=Ko,/Ko. (12c)
Note that b is the percentage of the capital stock from the
beginning of the planning period surviving in period t (i.e., the
average survival rate) and, in general, depends on the history of
delivered capital. Consider the following functional equation,
= (12d)
and its relation to the A's in (12a) and the 6's in (7b),
s0 s=O s=0 s0
At =tdD /tdD =6ttdD 'td = (12e)Equation (12d) is Cauchy's functional equation of the exponential
function, and all non-trivial solutions to (12d) imply that the 's
follow a geometric pattern (Eichhom, 1978, Chapter l.4),9
st-s =(l6)ts=(l)t(l&)s =&t&sand d—oo. (12f)
Equation (12a) can be written as follows,
V0 =K10i (l_o)t . (12g)
By (7b) with ltD[•] =0and (ib), we obtain (11). The converse follows
directly.li
The key condition underlying the derivation of Proposition II is that
the average survival weights for existing capital (At) equal the
marginal survival weights for new capital (o), which are
independent of past acquisitions.10 Equation (11) states that the
value of the firm at the beginning of the period equals the available
capital stock multiplied by the marginal gross return per unit of
capital adjusted for depreciation.11 Since returns become available
9 The two trivial solutions are =O Vt,s, which is of no economic
interest, and =1 and 3=O Vt,s which defines a non-durable
factor of production.
10 The relation between geometric depreciation and the constancy of
the average replacement rate has been noted by Jorgenson (1974).
11 This adjustment is needed because existing capital depreciates
immediately while new capital begins depreciating the following
period. Since 4 is the shadow price for new capital, it must be
adjusted for one period of depreciation.
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atthe end of the period, they are discounted by (1 +p 1).12
Theseadjustments for depreciation and discounting go
unnoticed in continuous-time models, and may have a measurable
effect on estimated investment models of the Tobin's Qvariety.In
this class of models, 4isthe key regressor, and has been equated in
previous studies to Tobin's Q,definedas "the ratio of the market
value of existing capital to its replacement cost" (Hayashi, 1982, p.
214, italics in the original):
=Qcvl= / K1 , (13a)
This conventional specification of Qdiffersfrom the modified defini-
tion following from the discrete-time framework (Proposition H13
=Qmod = ((l+pt) -i) / ((1-6)K..i) , (13b)
12Notethat the presence of (1-6) and (i+pi) in (11) is independent of
the assumption that only capital available at the beginning of the
period affects current production. This timing convention is reflected
solely in the definitions of 7t[.}(la)and(7a). If current deliveries
were permitted to affect current production through the capital
stock, then =
13 Differencesbetween the conventional and modified definitions of
Qwoulddisappear if we maintained the unreasonable assumption
that the firm receives its cash flows at the beginning of the period
and the more palatable assumption that new capital begins
depreciating immediately upon delivery.In this model, the latter
timing assumption does not comport well with the exclusion of
current deliveries from affecting current production (cf., (la) and
(2b)).and has two implications for the estimated coefficient on4. First,
this coefficient is usually interpreted as dependingsolely on the
adjustment cost technology.14 Equation (13b) reveals, however, that
it is properly interpreted as a combination of adjustmentcost and
depreciation parameters. Furthermore, econometric Qmodelshave
uniformly generated estimates of the 4coefficientthat imply
unreasonably sluggish responses of investment to variations in the
economic environment.'5 One explanation for this unsatisfactory
result is that QCV1 is excessively volatile relative to the time series for
investment. However, insofar as the firm's discount rate and
financial market value are negatively correlated, Qmod will be less
volatile, and may lead to more reasonably estimated parameters.
14 See Hayashi (1982,p. 218) or equation (7c) with separability
between the adjustment cost and production technologies.
15 See the simulations in Summers(1981) in which "only three-
fourths of the ultimate adjustment of the capital stock takes place
within twenty years" (p. 101).
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IV. SUMMARYAND CONCLUSION
This paper has highlighted the importance of distributed lag
constraints on the shadow price-asset value relation.In a model
with only one capital good, there nonetheless exists a number of
distributed lag constraints that lead to additional state variables
impairing the usefulness of asset values in empirical work
(Proposition I). Even when the model was reduced to one state
variable, the unrestricted nature of the distributed lag parameters
precluded the firm's financial value from identifying the unobserved
shadow price of capital. In order for asset prices to regain their role
in empirical work, it was required that the survival weights on
capital follow a geometric pattern (Proposition II). With the implicit
assumptions concerning distributed lags made clear, these results
indicate to the applied researcher the conditions under which the
substantial information contained in asset prices can be exploited.If
delivery, expenditure, or gestation lags are viewed as important to
the problem under study, then asset prices will not prove useful in
estimation, and other methods of solving the unobservable
expectations problem will have to be utilized.16 However, these
distributed lags will be of less importance at lower frequencies and,
thus, the estimation of Qinvestmentmodels is most likely to be
successful when conducted with annual data.
16 Empirical studies that incorporate these distributed lags and are
based explicitly on an optimizing framework are rare. See Chirinko
(1987, Table II) for a review of the intertemporalconstraints used in
previous investment studies, and Chirinko (1984)for a model
estimating distributed lag parameters with a two-step forecasting
method.17
REFERENCES
Abel, Andrew B., 1979, Investment and the Value of Capital (Garland
Publishing, New York).
_______andOlivier Blanchard, 1984, "The Present Value of
Profits and Cyclical Movements in Investment," Harvard
University.
Chirinko, Robert S., 1982, "The Not-So-Conventional Wisdom Concern-
ing Taxes, Inflation, and Capital Formation," National Tax
Association -TaxInstitute of America Proceedings, 272-281.
________1984,"New Orders and Lags in the Acquisition of Capital,"
Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
_______1987,"Will 'The' Neoclassical Theory of Investment Please
Rise?: The General Structure Of Investment Models And Their
Implications For Tax Policy," in: Jack M. Mintz and Douglas D.
Purvis, eds., The Impact of Taxation On Business Investment
(John Deutsch Institute of Economic Policy, Kingston, Ontario).
Eichhorn, Wolfgang, 1978, Functional Equations in Economics
(Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts).
Eisner, Robert, and Robert H. Strotz, 1963, "Determinants of Business
Investment," in: Commission On Money And Credit. Impacts Of
Monetary Policy (Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey).
Hansen, Lars P., and Thomas J. Sargent, 1980, "Formulating and
Estimating Dynamic Linear Rational Expectations Models,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics And Control 2, 9-46.
_______andKenneth J. Singleton, 1982, "Generalized Instrumental
Variables Estimation Of Nonlinear Rational Expectations
Models," Econometrica 50, 1269-1286.
Hasbrouck, Joel, 1985, "The Characteristics of Takeover Targets:
q and Other Measures," Journal of Banking and Finance 9,
351-3 62.Hayashi, Fumio, 1982, "Tobin's Marginal q and Average q: A
Neoclassical Interpretation," Econometric a 50, 213-224.
Jorgenson, Dale W., 1974, "The Economic Theory of Replacement and
Depreciation," in: Willy Sellekaerts, ed., Econometrics and
Economic TheoryEssays in Honour of Jan Tinbergen
(International Arts and Sciences Press, White Plains, New
York), 189-221.
Kamien, Morton I., and E. Muller, 1976, "Optimal Control With
Integral State Equations," The Review Of Economic Studies 43,
469-47 3.
Kleindorfer, G.B., P.R. Kleindorfer, and R.L. Thompson, 1977, "The
Discrete Time Maximum Principle," in: Charles Tapiero, ed.,
Managerial Planning: An Optimum and A Stochastic Control
Approach (Gordon Breech Science Publishers, New York),
375-3 82.
Lindenberg, Eric B., and Stephen A. Ross, 1981, "Tobin's q Ratio and
Industrial Organization," Journal of Business 54, 1-32.
Lucas, Robert E., 1967, "Optimal Investment Policy And The Flexible
Accelerator," International Economic Review 8, 78-85.
_______1976,"Econometric Policy Evaluation: A Critique," in: Karl
Brunner and Allan H. Meltzer, eds., Carnegie-Rochester
Conferences in Public Policy, The Phillips Curve and Labor
Markets (North-Holland, Amsterdam), 19-46.Reprinted, 1981,
in: Studies in Business Cycle Theory (MIT, Cambridge),104-130.
Salinger, Michael A., 1984, "Tobin's q, Unionization, and the
Concentration-Profits Relationship," Rand Journal of Economics
15, 159-170.
Smirlock, Michael, Thomas Gilligan, and William Marshall, 1984,
"Tobin's q And The Structure-Performance Relationship,"
American Economic Review 74, 1051-1060.
Summers, Lawrence H., 1981, "Taxation and Corporate Investment: A
q-Theory Approach," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
1981.1, 67-140.
18Tobin, James, 1969, "A General Equilibrium Approach To Monetary
Theory," Journal of Money. Credit. And Banking 1, 15-29.
Weitzman, Martin L., and Schmidt, A.G., 1971, "The Maximum
Principle for Discrete Economic Processes on an Infinite Time
Interval," Kibernetika 5, 22-35.
Wildasin, David E., 1984, "The q Theory Of Investment With Many
Capital Goods," American Economic Review 74, 203-210.
19